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FALSE OR SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE: WHY A
NEED FOR THE PROSECUTORIAL TIE?
RONALD L. CARLSON*

"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good orfor ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.'"
-Mr. Justice Brandeisf
"We know that a trial based on false or suppressed evidence is no
trial at all. False or suppressed evidence can neither convict nor
condemn."
- United States ex rel.
Hough v. Maroneytt
Many United States Supreme Court decisions have overturned
criminal convictions for the reason that the government employed
false evidence to obtain the conviction or failed to disclose relevant
evidence important to the defense. In reversing federal or state
judgments, the Court often has located direct proof of wrongdoing
by the prosecutor. The notorious "bloody shorts" case is an
example in point.' There, the state introduced as evidence a pair of
men's "blood-stained" undershorts to achieve conviction of the
accused. When the blood turned out to be red paint, the Supreme
Court granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant because "[ilt
was further established that counsel for the prosecution had known
at the time of the trial that the shorts were stained with paint ...
2
The prosecution deliberately misrepresented the truth."
*Professor of Law. University of Iowa College of Law. B.A. 1956. Augustana College- J.D.
1959. Northwestern University- LL.M. 1961. Georgetown Law Center (E. Barrett Prettyman
Fellow in Trial Advocacy). The author served as counsel for the petitioner in Johnson v.
Bennett. 393 U.S. 253 (1968). which raised certain issues analogous to those explored in this
article. The case was resolved in the Supreme Court on another point.
tOlmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438.485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
tt247 F. Supp. 767. 779 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
' Miller v. Pate. 386 U.S. I (1967).
2jl. at 6. "in the Millr case, the Court found that the prosecutor at the time of trial knew
the incriminating shorts were stained with paint and the stains were passed off at trial as blood
stains." Johnson v. Bennett. 386 I-.2d 677. 680 (8th Cir. 1967). racawd. 393 U.S. 253 (1968).
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Judicial opinions in this area of the law have frequently
emphasized the prosecutor's historic duty not to convict but rather
to do justice. Violations of this duty by the state's prosecuting
officer can create constitutional problems of verdict-rupturing
magnitude: "It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one." 3
That deliberate evidence-suppressing conduct by the prosecutor
voids a conviction is clear. But the problem becomes more difficult
when the hiding of documents or witnesses is accomplished not by
the prosecutor but by a lower-ranking minion of the state. What if
a police officer discovers important evidence which is helpful to the
defendant and fails to call it to the attention of either the prosecutor
or the defense?
To explore the practical impact of such problems it is helpful to
pose an illustrative situation. A police detective in the course of a
homicide investigation seizes a pistol from the accused. At trial
several witnesses testify that the gun looks exactly like the murder
weapon. The accused is convicted. However, unknown to the
attorneys in the case the police detective had a ballistics test run on
the gun shortly after its seizure which demonstrated that the pistol
had not been fired for several months. Thus, it could not have been
the murder weapon Ultimately the defense learns of the ballistics
report. The question next comes: Does the judgment of conviction
remain intact in consequence of the fact that the prosecutor was
unaware of crucial defense evidence held by the police?
If the answer to the above inquiry appears obvious, consider a
1967 United States Court of Appeals proclamation on the subject:
So far as we have been able to ascertain, all the Supreme Court cases
setting aside convictions for want of due process by reason of the reception
of false testimony are based upon knowledge of the prosecutor that the
testimony received is false or knowledge that material evidence has been
suppressed. Such would appear to be a proper limitation of the rule.rer'd. 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969). Civil actions against prosecutors who suppress or falsify
evidence are discussed in Comment. ctions lgaimi Prowcutorv Who Suppres. or Falvifr
Evidence. 47 TEXAS L. REV. 642 (1969).

'Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Sec Jackson v. Wainwright. 390 F.2d 288.
294 (5th Cir. 1968); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7. ETHICAL CONSIDERATION
7-13.
'The example posed here resembles the fact pattern presented the federal court in Barbee v.
Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). a case involving suppressed ballistics reports in a
prosecution for felonious assault.
'Johnson v.Bennett. 386 F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 1967). vacated. 393 U.S. 253 (1968), rev'd.
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Strictly applied, this rule would prevent the homicide conviction

posed above from being overturned on appeal or in habeas corpus.
Absent knowledge by the prosecutor himself of the ballistics report,

a police officer's misconduct in 9uppressing relevant evidence would
be insufficient to invalidate the conviction. Other-courts have

displayed a decided reticence to overturn convictions without proof
of complicity by the prosecutor in the wrongdoing.' Such proof is
frequently hard to come by, leaving open major issues in these cases:
Does the conduct of a police officer in suppressing evidence
constitute state action which deprives a conviction of its due process
base, assuming such suppression is eventually discovered? In the
false evidence cases, can a defendant who was condemned by
perjured testimony successfully attack his conviction even though he
lacks proof of governmental connivance in the perjury? In dealing
with these issues this article explores the question of whether the Due
Process Clause is addressed to the prosecutor alone, or applies as
well to police and others who may traffic in suppressed or false

evidence.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Supreme Court opinions treating the problems of false and
suppressed evidence extend across 35 years of Court history.7 A
414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added). At another point in the decision, the court
refused to invalidate the state court conviction of the prisoner under his contention that a
county'sheriff had falsified the return on a subpoena issued for a defense witness. The court
stated: "The record indicates that the prosecuting attorney had no knowledge of the falsity
of the return, and defendant as a witness states that he has no evidence to the contrary." Id.
at 681. See the analysis of Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 394 U.S.
966 (1969), note 20 infra. See also Hysler.v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411,419,421 n.4 (1942).
'See. e.g.. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 419, 421 n.4 (1942); Green v. United States,
313 F.2d 6. 8 n.2 (1st Cir.). cert. denied. 372 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Lawrenson,
298 F.2d 880, 888 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 370 U.S. 947 (1962); United States v. Jakalski,
237 F.2d 503, 504-05 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied. 353 U.S. 939 (1957) ("The introduction
of perjured testimony without more does not violate the constitutional rights of the accused.
It is the knowing and intentional use of such testimony by the prosecuting authorities that is
a denial of due process of law."); Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 829, 832 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied. 351 U.S. 986 (1956) (perjured testimony does not void a conviction unless
prosecuting officials knew at the time testimony was used that it was perjured); In re Sawyer's
Petition, 229 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 351 U.S. 966 (1956) ("Sawyer's Federal
Constitutional rights were not denied unless perjured testimony was introduced with the
knowledge of the prosecutor that it was perjured."). See also Marcella v. United States, 344
F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1016 (1966); Tilghman v. Hunter, 167
F.2d 661, 662 (10th Cir. 1948); Note, A Fresh Look at the Suppressed Evidence Rule. 34
BROOKLYN L. REv.269 (1968).

"Supreme Court decisions which deal with the false-suppressed evidence problem in criminal

1174

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

(Vol. 1969: 1171

significant recent treatment of the suppressed evidence question is the
Court's 1967 decision in Giles v. Maryland,8 a case which involved

petitioners originally convicted of rape and sentenced to death.
Serious questions later arose concerning whether police reports

which contained statements of the prosecutrix inconsistent with her
trial testimony had been disclosed to the defense.9 These reports were

highly relevant in terms of assessing the-credibility of the state's
chief witness in a case wherein credibility was a crucial factor."'
Although the plurality opinion in Giles avoided laying down
broad constitutional rules for disclosure of evidence, the rationales
of the concurring and dissenting opinions focused on the
prosecutor's obligation to disclose information to the defense. Under
the view expressed in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas,
disclosure should be made of all evidence which, generously
conceived, is material to the case." Mr. Justice Harlan, writing the
dissent, pointed out that the standard developed in certain Supreme

Court cases required prosecutorial disclosure only of items which
2
may affect the outcome of the trial.'

Amid the controversy over appropriate standards, for the
guidance of prosecutors, it is the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
White which highlights for future consideration a major question
posed in this article. The White opinion raises the problem of
prosecutions include United States v. Augenblick. 393 U.S. 348 (1969): Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate. 386 U.S. I (1967): Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963):
Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960); Napue v. Illinois. 360 U.S. 264 (1959): Alcorta v,
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Mesarosh v. United States. 352 U.S. I (1956): Griffin v. United
States, 336 U.S. 704 (1949); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945): New York tvrxI. Whitman
v.Wilson, 318 U.S. 688 (1943); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Hysler v. Florida. 315
U.S. 411 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
In the non-criminal field, the Court's treatment of the problem appears to date to be United
States v. Throckmorton. 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
'386 U.S. 66 (1967).
1Id. at 80.
"Id. at 70. Also noted by the Court was the possible bearing of the reports on the basic
question of guilt or innocence. Id. at 77.
"Id. at 98.
11d. at 116. Controversy over what type of nondisclosure rises to the level of a due process
violation continues. See United States v. Acarino, 408 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.). cer. d'enh'd. 395
U.S. 961 (1969). which posed the following question to the Supreme Court: Was due process
violated by a prosecutor's failure to inform the court or defense counsel that a key prosecution
witness was under indictment for larceny. See also Nash v Illinois. 389 U.S. 906 (1967)
(denial of certiorari; Fortas. J.. Warren. C.J.. & Douglas. J.. dissenting); Crowder v. United
States, 406 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1969): Nash v. Purdy. 283 1- Supp. 837. 842 (S.D. Fla. 1968):
Vessels v. State. 432 S.W.2d 108. 110. 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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attributing the conduct of other persons to the prosecutor, the
prosecutor in this instance being the State's Attorney for
Montgomery County, Maryland. Voting to remand the Giles case
to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice White concluded:
There is another matter for the consideration of the Maryland court:
the prosecuting attorney of Montgomery County was not charged with the

knowledge of Prince George's County officers but he was charged with

what the police officers of Montgomery County knew. Was he also charged
with the knowledge of other Montgomery County officials such as Lynn
Adams, and, to the extent of their involvement
with Montgomery County
13
agencies, Dr. Connor and Dr. Doudoumopoulis?

This passage arguably intimates approval of a rule which would
charge a prosecuting attorney with knowledge possessed by a peace
officer in the prosecutor's home county. A different case may be
suggested where officers holding valuable exculpatory information or
evidence are from another county of the state. Under one view, the
knowledge of these latter officers may not be charged to the
prosecutor, and apparently their failure to disclose the evidence
would create no due process violation. As for attribution to the
prosecutor of knowledge held by non-police officials, this question
was left open in the White opinion.
The emphasis by Justice White in Giles on the relevant
knowledge of police or other officials which may be charged to a
prosecutor points up the pivotal position of the prosecuting attorney
in these cases. Rather than focusing directly on the conduct of the
13386 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added). In State v. Giles, 239 Ma. 458. 470, 212 A.2d 101, l08
(1965), the Maryland Court of Appeals held it reasonable to charge the prosecutor with
relevant information known to the local police department, but that to go further would
impose an "'unworkable burden on local authorities." Such a judicial approach to the problem
appears in the colloquy between the Court and petitioner's counsel in the argument of Johnson
v. Bennett. 393 U.S. 253 (1968). There, the sheriff's office in a county of the state some 160
miles removed from the place of trial allegedly suppressed key evidence:
Q. (by one of the Justices) I take it the sheriff is unavailable?
A. (by counsel for the prisoner) Yes. He is deceased. Your Honor.
Q. Did you say this county was 160 miles from the trial county?

A. Yes.
Q. The prosecutor, I take it. is the official in the trial county?.

A. Yes.
Q. Was there any evidence that the local sheriff in that county knew anything of this?
A. There is no evidence in the record, Your Honor, positive and clearcut ....

o

This question of knowing suppression of evidence ordinarily involves someone.
sudh as a local police officer, who was responsible.
Record at 5-6, Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253 (1968).
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police as a responsible arm of the state, some judicial authority
analyzes the kind of police activity which may be attributed to an
unknowing prosecutor: 4 If the police suppression of evidence cannot

be connected with the prosecutor under an agency theory, as may
be the case when the suppression is achieved by out-of-county

officers, the conviction is unassailable. That the Supreme Court has
not specifically rebuffed this position is indicated by a review of
relevant Court opinions and is further revealed in a recent appellate
argument before the Court.'5
Supreme Court cases in this area of the law overturning
convictions on due process grounds almost invariably involve
participation by the prosecutor in the wrongdoing." It is submitted
that this coincidence of fact should not insulate from attack those
convictions wherein the prosecutor has clean hands but which are
nonetheless tainted by false or suppressed evidence emanating from
"See Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795,806 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
"See the questions raised by the Court during the argument in Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S.
253 (1968), set forth in note 13 supra. In the false evidence field, the view of one Justice as
to the prior Court history on the point appears to be reflected in this question: "We have not
yetin this Court, have we, said if false testimony gets in that it is fatal to a conviction unless
it got in with a knowledge of its falsity on the part of the prosecution?" Record at 42-43,
Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253 (1968).
"See. e.g.. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (Prosecutor held to have deliberately
misrepresented the truth about a state's exhibit, both in evidence presentation and during
argument to the jury); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process violated when
prosecution withheld co-defendant's confession after demand for same by the accused,
although prosecutor's action was not the result of guile); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959) (failure of the prosecutor to correct the testimony of a state witness which the
prosecutor knew to be false denied the defendant due process of law); Alcorta v. Texas, 355
U.S. 28 (1957) (testimony which gave jury false impression elicited by prosecutor who knew
facts to be to the contrary); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) (petitioner's allegation that
prosecuting attorney bribed two state witnesses made out prima facie violation of fourteenth
amendment) (dictum). Perhaps an arguable deviation from the text statement is Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). See the analysis of PyIe in Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707,
713 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied. 358 U.S. 948 (1959). See also Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S.
277, 291 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
Concentration by the Supreme Court on the prosecutor's role appears to have inclined the
commentators to focus primary attention on this officer's dislcosure obligations. Limited
treatment has been accorded the related problems explored in this article. See generally 34
BROOKLYN L. Rev., supra note 6; Note, The DutY of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence. 60 COLUM. L. REv. 858 (1960); Comment, Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal
Cases: Where are We Headed? 6 DuQUESNE L. REv. 41 (1967); Comment, Criminal Discovery'
Implications of the False Evidence and Suppression of Evidence Cases, 34 TENN. L. REv. 654
(1967); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional DutY to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant. 74
YALE L.J. 136 (1964); 77 HARV. L. REv. 1528 (1964); 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 764 (1967); 42
NOTRE DAM LAW. 264 (1966).
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a different source. A broader emphasis is urged. In the suppressed
evidence cases, rather than searching for an agency rationale or

other devices to "charge" the prosecutor with knowledge held by
others, a state action concept is suggested to cover all law

enforcement officers in the state.
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES: POSTURE OF THE CURRENT LAW

Three problem areas are typically presented in these cases: (1)a
policeman in the same locality as the prosecutor suppresses relevant
proof; (2) the police in another- locality suppress potential defense
evidence; (3) false evidence is injected into the trial of the case by a

private citizen, not a policeman. Each presents different levels of
inquiry, and various approaches employed by disparate courts
provide the framework for analysis.
Suppression of Evidence: Local Police

The geographical area over which a prosecutor has jurisdiction
is generally a county or district, 17 and prosecutors frequently have
been held responsible for peace officer suppressions within their
"territory." Barbee v. Warden,18 a leading authority on this issue,
makes the point: "The police are also part of the prosecution, and
the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State's
Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure."1 9 Notwithstanding

occasional judicial comments to the contrary,21 the point seems so
"Movement toward district attorney systems is reported in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE

COURTS 74 (1967).
11331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).

"Id. at 846. See also Nash v. Purdy, 283 F. Supp. 837, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1968); State v. Giles,
239 Md. 458,470, 212 A.2d 101,108 (1965), vacated. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
"United States v. Lawrenson, 298 F.2d 880, 888 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 370 U.S. 947
(1962). The recent case of Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 394 U.S.
966 (1969). is summarized in Note, Police Not Obligated to Disclose Fa'ts Unknown to
Prosecutor.1969 L. &SOCIAL ORDER 297:
Luna presented squarely one of the major ambiguities in the line of decisions. It is clear
that the prosecutor has a duty to reveal information that bears on the accuracy of
testimony or evidence presented during trial. But, if the prosecuting attorney has no
knowledge of information that he would have to disclose if it were in his possession, is
a conviction constitutionally defective because of failure on the part of police officers
in possession of this information to initiate steps to see that defense is aware of its
existence? According to the en banc court in Luna. the answer is no. Although the court
advanced a number of reasons for refusing to hold the conviction invalid, the opinion
makes clear that heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the police officers with
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well established today that a recent federal opinion terms this
principle "no longer subject to serious dispute."'"
What is more difficult is whether the reviewing court must weigh
the potential force of the suppressed evidence, testing the probable
admissibility of the hidden proof, contemplating its possible effect
on the outcome of the trial. Such hindsight testing is regularly
employed when the proseeutor has neglected his duty to call
significant evidence within his knowledge to the attention of the
defendant.? In order to overturn a conviction under this rationale,
most courts insist that the convicted party demonstrate the
materiality of the suppressed evidence2 3 The reasons for placing this
burden on the appellant were identified by Judge Henry J. Friendly
in United States v. Keogh2' as "the avoidance of impossible burdens
on prosecutors and the need to preserve the finality of
convictions . . .
knowledge that charges had been brought were not in the courtroom at the time that
the witness gave the incorrect testimony. Id. at 302-03.
"Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 806 (C.D. Cal. 1969). See Augenblick v. United
States, 377 F.2d 586, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1967), rev'd. 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Curran v. Delaware.
259 F.2d 707 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied. 358 U.S. 948 (1959); Nash v. Purdy, 283 F. Supp.
837, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1968); People v. Robertson, 12 N.Y.2d 355, 190 N.E.2d 19 (1963); Note.
Discover " in Massachusetts CrininalProceedings-A Surrey of . vailtihl Devices and \ ('
Trends. 2 SUFFOLK L. REV. 272, 286-87 (1968); 34 TENN. L. REV.. supra note 16, at 660-63:
42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 764,766 n.-20 (1967).
nUnited States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968).
"See, e.g.. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). "[i]he suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. at 87; United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1969): United States
v. Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert denied. 389 U.S. 886 (1967); Kyle v. United States,
297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir 1961); United States v Consolidated Laundries Corp.. 291 F.2d 563
(2d Cir. 1961).
24391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
1Id. at 146. The opinion points out that the question of whether a conviction should be
overturned generally arises in a habeas corpus proceeding as opposed to direct appeal 34
BROOKLYN L. REv.. vupra note 6, at 270 n.9. Perhaps this is because facts sustaining the
suppression claim frequently do not come to light until well after original trial of the case. In
any event, numerous cases void convictions in habeas corpus without implying that any higher
standard of proof will be exacted than if the defendant were seeking to overturn the conviction
on direct appeal. However, the Keogh decision does draw a distinction between habeas corpus
and corain nobis proceedings. With the latter, in the absence of proof of deliberate
prosecutorial misconduct, relief will be granted only when the court concludes that the
undisclosed evidence probably would have raised a reasonable doubt of guilt in the mind of a
juror. The heavy.evidentiary burden placed on a defendant in coram nohis cases is based upon
the lower incidence of reprosecution and retrial when convictions are voided in c'oran nobi%
391 F.2d at 148. Further qualifications are added in footnote 9 to the Aeogh opinion. Id at
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To appreciate these grounds it is necessary to understand that
suppression of evidence today connotes two distinct types of

prosecutorial conduct. In the older cases evidence was suppressed
when the prosecutor deliberately hid evidence important to the
defendant.2 Current law also includes as suppression any
prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence which the defendant could
have put to important use, even though no defense request for the

evidence was made. 2 In the latter class of cases; termed passive
nondisclosures by many courts, the undisclosed evidence must be

highly material in order for the defense to successfully attack the
conviction. 2 This is not so with deliberate suppression by the
prosecutor, however. Courts promptly overturn judgments tainted by
deliberate wrongdoing in order to deter conduct which is detrimental
to the integrity of the judicial process. Actual materiality of the

suppressed evidence is of limited importance in such cases. 29
But, do or should these evidence testing rules operate in similar

fashion where the police alone are proved responsible for the
suppression, without prosecutorial complicity? It would appear that

no meaner standards should be applied to police suppression. When
a police officer misrepresents the whereabouts of a defense witness
148-49. For standards in connection with motions for new trial based upon false evidence, see
cases cited notes 43-44 inlra.
'0. 391 F.2d at 148:
Deliberate prosecutorial misconduct is presumably infrequent: to invalidate convictions
in the few cases where this is proved, even on a fairly low showing of materiality, will
have a relatively small impact on the desired finality of judgments and will deter
conduct undermining the integrity of the judicial system. Id.
-S'See Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d
287 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Both of these cases provide excellent collections of authority in the falsesuppressed evidence fields. See al%o Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Poole. 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326
F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
-'"Under one view, such evidence must raise a high probability that disclosure thereof to the
defense would have altered the result in the trial of the case. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d
138. 148 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966); Link
v. United States. 352 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 383 U.S. 915 (1966); Smallwood
v. Warden. 205 F. Supp. 325. 329 (D. Md. 1962). In a very recent case, the Second Circuit
ruled that undisclosed evidence was material and a new trial required even though the
suppressed evidence probably would not have produced a different verdict. United States v.
Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 578 (2d Cir. 1969).
2
'SVee United States v. Acarino, 408 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 961
(1969); c. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961); Note, Individualized
Crimninal Justice in the Suprenze Court: ,- Study of Dispositional Decision Making. 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1260, 1273-75 (1968).
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or threatens such witness, causing him" to be absent from the trial
of the case, any conviction obtained by the state should be
overturned without extensive inquiry into whether the testimony of
the witness would have changed the outcome.se However, courts have
not uniformly applied the prosecutorial standard to police
misconduct, and some authorities demand a showing of materiality
of the suppressed evidence even in deliberate suppression cases.', It
"'As in the prosecutor cases, such deliberate police conduct is not ordinary. Still, such
instances occasionally occur. See Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated.
393 U.S. 253 (1968), rev'd. 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969), wherein the petitioner alleged that a
sheriff charged with the duty of serving subpoenas on defense witnesses locked up one of the
witnesses and reported that the witness was in an "Institute for Insane." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the record:
By the reason of defendant's poverty, the court directed that certain witnesses,
including Thomas Orcussi, be subpoenaed for the defendant at State expense. The
sheriff at Burlington [Iowa, the place of trial] assumed responsibility for the service of
such subpoenas by sending them to the sheriff of Polk County [165 miles away] for
service upon the witnesses residing in Des Moines. With respect to Orcussi, the
subpoena was returned unserved with the notice, "Thomas Orcussi is in Clarinda
Institute for. Insane." No further attempt was made to secure Orcussi, apparently in
reliance upon such statement, and Orcussi did not appear as a witness at defendant's
trial.
In the present proceeding, the Polk County jail records were introduced in evidence
and they disclosed that Orcussi was in the Polk County jail serving a thirty-day
sentence for intoxication during the period the subpoena was in the hands of the Polk
County sheriff for service. The jail records show nothing with respect to the transfer
of Orcussi to a mental hospital. The trial court in its opinion observes that his
independent investigation discloses that the records at the Clarinda Institution do not
show that Orcussi was ever received at such institution. Such evidence establishes a
prima facie case that the return of the Polk County sheriff is false. No explanation
has been made by the State. Fairness requires an observation that persons who might
be in a position to explain the return are no longer available. The record indicates that
the prosecuting attorney had no knowledge of the falsity of the return, and defendant
as a witness states that he has no evidence to the contrary. Id. at 680-81.
Cases which involve the problem of police/prosecutor suppression or intimidation of
witnesses include Turner v. Ward, 321 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963); United States ex reL
Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 391 (N.D. I1. 1949) (the States Attorney by threats
of intimidation prevented any witnesses from testifying in behalf of James Montgomery),
People v. Garippo, 321 Ill. 157, 163, 151 N.E. 584, 586 (1926); Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88,
102-06, 161 N.E. 375, 380-82 (1928); Hudson v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 582, 295 S.W. 886
(1927). See E. HOPKINS. OUR LAWLESS POLICE 280-82 (1931); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
LAW OaSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 284
(1931) (Wickersham Report). Where the suppression of evidence involves frustration of the
defendant's subpoenas for defense witnesses, a violation of the sixth amendment right to
compulsory process to secure witnesses may coalesce with a suppression of evidence claim.
See Barton v. Wainwright, 412 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1969). That the right to compulsory process
includes the right to service of that process, see Brewer v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 341, 342 (10th
Cir. 1947); State v. Copola, 157 La. 98, 102 So. 82 (1924).
31
E.g.. Johnson'v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated. 393 U.S. 253 (1968),
rev'd. 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969), discussed note 28 supra.
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is urged that convictions involving deliberate suppression of evidence
should be readily overturned on a very low showing of materiality.
Deliberate suppression of evidence by police is as destructive, and as
much merits deterring, as similar conduct by a prosecutor.
Officers Outside the Prosecutor'sDistrict
The state court decision in State v. Giles32 posits one
view-misconduct of non-local officers cannot be imputed to the
trial prosecutor. "In order to decide what evidence can be said to
have been suppressed it is first necessary to determine what the
prosecution was charged with knowing. 3 3 The decision holds it
appropriate "to charge the prosecutor and his agents who have the
duty of preparing and presenting the case, with knowledge of all
seemingly pertinent facts related to the charge which are known to
the .police department who represent the local subdivision that has
jurisdiction to try the case." The responsibility of the prosecutor
is limited to knowledge held by these local officers. Thus, while it is
frequently stated that deliberate suppression of evidence by the
prosecution will vitiate a criminal conviction, the meaning of the
term "prosecution" in these cases has varied; in some cases the term
has been limited to the trial prosecutor and those law enforcement
officers within the governmental unit over which that prosecutor has
jurisdiction, while in others the "prosecution" has been held to
include those police agencies of the state directly involved in the
investigation of the case. Unconnected out-of-county officers
generally have not been included. That there remains lack of decisive
direction by the Supreme Court in this particular is evidenced
through language drawn from the first United States court of
appeals decision in Johnson v. Bennett. 5 A sheriff from an area
outside the county wherein the accused was being tried was charged
with suppression of valuable defense evidence. The court of appeals
observed: "An interesting question is raised as to whether 'the
prosecutor' is chargeable with the suppression of evidence for which
the sheriff of another county of the state, apparently having no
=239 Md.458,470, 212 A.2d 101,108 (1965).

mid.

uld.
p386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated. 393 U.S. 253 (1968), rev'd. 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.

1969).
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connection with the prosecutor, is responsible. We need not reach
such problem here .... "36
The difficulty with any rule in this field which would not penalize
suppression by out-of-county officers is its potential for abuse.
Especially in deliberate suppression cases, invalidating the conviction
appears appropriate. The law of confessions provides an interesting
comparative analysis, for it cannot be seriously contended that a
confession, brutally extracted from an accused by sheriff's deputies
outside the county of trial, could be held admissible simply because
the police or prosecuting attorney of the trial county did not assist
in the brutality. In contrast, misconduct by remote police officers in
the suppression of evidence field could run unchecked under the
3
judicial approach indicated in specified suppression cases.
A final problem in this area involves passive omission as opposed
to willful misleading of the defense. Perhaps out-of-county officers
have exculpatory documents in their possession which would prove

extremely helpful to a defendant, but which have not been requested

by that accused. The police in possession may be unaware of the
"Id. at 681. A variation on this theme might involve suppression by federal officers of
evidence helpful to an accused who is being tried in state court. Where both state and federal
officers are involved in the investigation of a case, eg.. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436.
494-95 (1966), federal authorities would be alerted to the defendant's need for helpful or
exculpatory information in the federal files, and an obligation to disclose would appear to
arise. Where federal officers have not been involved in the investigation or apprehension a
more difficult situation presents itself. Under the 'dual sovereignties" approach strong
arguments could be forged against overturning state court convictions because of
nondisclosure perpetrated by another sovereign. Although the separate sovereign notion has
been weakened in recent years, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964): Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960): L. HALL. Y. KA.IISAR. W. LA FAVE. J. ISRA..
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1213 (1969). it may yet have application in the suppressed
evidence field. Perhaps a workable approach in this area might be to permit the individual
defendant's interest to prevail on a case-by-case basis where the undisclosed evidence is highly
material, consistent with the emphasis of recent cases that new trials should be granted not
to punish prosecutors but to achieve fairness in the trial of the accused. See note 48 hilra
"This approach appears to preserve a sort of "'silver platter" rule in the suppression of
evidence field. That rule allowed federal prosecutions to profit from improper conduct of nonfederal police agencies. If state police officers illegally searched a suspect's premises and
uncovered proof of federal crime, the proof could be turned over to federal officers on a "silver
platter" and used in evidence free of illegal search objections. The doctrine was utlimately
destroyed in Elkins v. United States. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Under the view articulated by some
authorities, a prosecutor similarly can try a criminal case free of objections that relevant
evidence was suppressed if such suppression is accomplished solely by out-of-county officers.
Other courts may recognize the impropriety of suppression by these officials, but may require
demonstrations of materiality of the suppressed proof before granting relief even in the
deliberate suppression cases. See authorities cited notes 13, 20. & 30 ittprat.

Vol. 1969: 11713

SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE

1183

value of the documents. In such cases, where important evidence has

not been volunteered, insistence by reviewing courts that the
defendant demonstrate a high degree of materiality of the

undisclosed proof before granting relief appears justified. Absent
willful wrongdoing, a convicti6n should not be unsettled unless the

evidence in official hands could have been put to substantial use by
the defense. But the defense should be allowed a chance to make this
showing. Any rule which would deny the defendant an opportunity
to do so on the ground that the erring police were remote officials
appears inconsistent with the constitutional right to a full and fair
trial.
False Evidence

Does a conviction based upon perjured testimony violate due
process of law, absent accompanying proof that there was
prosecutorial knowledge of or complicity in the perjury? Put
differently, can a defendant overturn a conviction on federal
constitutional grounds if he lacks evidence of governmental
connivance in the false testimony?
The cases, badly split on this question, have arisen primarily in
habeas corpus proceedings. One line of authority holds that due
process must condemn with "equal abhorrence" a conviction based
upon false evidence either known or unknown to the prosecutor.
13A leading case supporting this view is Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
Defendant was convicted in state court of murder upon the testimony of two witnesses, one
of whom testified as to the decedent's dying declaration. New evidence was presented in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding indicating that the witness who allegedly heard the dying
declaration was not in fact present at the demise of the deceased and did not have knowledge
of the matters to which she testified. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that
the infirmity of the trial evidence was not disclosed until after conviction, and that court's
decision dealt with the problem of false evidence in criminal trials wherein the falsity is
unknown to the prosecuting officers. The court concluded that due process must condemn with
"equal abhorrence" a conviction based upon false evidence either known or unknown to the
prosecutor.
Relying upon the Jones case, a federal district court in United States ex rel. Montgomery
v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. Ill. 1949), freed a prisoner 25 years after his original
conviction, summarizing as follows:
The facts in this case present a situation almost identical with that before the court
in the case of Jones v. Coninonwealth of Kentuckv. 6 Cir., 97 F.2d 335. In both cases,
petitioners were convicted and had served a substantial portion of their lives in the
penitentiary. In both cases the perjury at the trial was first discovered by the convicted
persons many years after the trial. In both cases the perjured testimony was vital to
the prosecution's case. . . . In a case of this nature one would not expect to find direct
proof of the connivance of the prosecution in the use of perjured testimony, and the
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Opposing this view are those decisions which require knowing use of
false evidence by the prosecution before any constitutional objection

to the conviction can be lodged."
A serious defect in the latter approach may be illustrated. Upon
his trial for murder the defendant is placed at the scene of a

homicide, gun in hand, by an eye witness. He is also coniiected to
the crime by other incriminating proof of lesser quality. Defendant
is convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His
conviction is affirmed on direct appeal. A few weeks later the eye
witness to the homicide is again walking in the neighborhood where
the murder occurred and sees a man walking in the opposite
direction who somewhat resembles the defendant. Upon taking a
closer look the witness is convinced that it is this man, and not the
condemned person, who perpetrated the homicide. The now firmly
circumstantial evidence presented is as strong as could reasonably be expected.
However, even if this evidence of knowing use of perjured testimony was not in the case,
I believe that even on the authority of the Jones case, this petitioner should be
discharged. Id.
See also Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 291 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33
See Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969). "[T]he current law in this
Circuit, contrary to the holding in Jones v. Kentucky. 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938), is that
'knowledge' by the prosecution is required to support a claim of denial of due process based
upon the existence of prejudicial perjured testimony in a criminal trial." Id. at 807-08. In
Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 351 U.S. 986 (1956), the court
held:
Such an issue requires two elements: (1) use of perjured testimony; and (2) knowledge
by the prosecuting officials, at the time the testimony was used, that it was perjured.
The latter element is a requisite because the fact that there may be false testimony does
not alone and of itself vitiate a judgment. Ryles v. United States, 10 Cir., 198 F.2d
199, 200. Id. at 832.
Several decisions have not gone further than the principle of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935), that the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured evidence violates due process. E.g..
Marcella v. United States, 344 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1016
(1966); Green v. United States, 313 F.2d 6, 8 n.2 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied. 372 U.S. 951 (1963);
In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 351 U.S. 966 (1956); United
States v. Spadafora, 200 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1952); Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th
Cir. 1951); Hinley v. Burford, 183 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1950): Tilghman v. Hunter, 167 F.2d
661, 662 (10th Cir. 1948); Hysler v. State, 146 Fla. 593, i So. 2d 628 (1941), affd, 315 U.S.
411 (1942); People v.. Robertson, 12 N.Y.2d 355, 359, 190 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1963). See Hysler
v. Florida, 315 U.S. 400, 413 (1942). Mr. Justice Frankfurter made this statement:
He [the defendant] cannot, of course, contend that mere recantation of testimony is in
itself ground for invoking the Due Process Clause against a conviction. However, if
Florida through her responsible officials knowingly used false testimony which was
extorted from a witness 'by violence and torture.' one convicted may claim the
protection of the Due Process Clause against a conviction based upon such testimony.
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convinced witness brings his beliefs immediately to the attention of
the prosecutor in the case. Can the mistake be corrected? Under the
rule adopted by many courts, the answer is no. Without proof that
a prosecutor knew he was presenting perjured or mistaken evidence
at the time he presented it the conviction is unassailable. 0

This approach, adhered to by several authorities, seems
inappropriate and stultifying. If false evidence contributed materially
to a conviction-if it occupied a significant role in the trial
record-the conviction should be upset and a new trial accorded the
accused. Prosecutorial participation is frequently difficult to prove,
even though it actually may be present. In cases "of this nature one
would not expect to find direct proof of the connivance of the
prosecution in the use of perjured testimony," 4' and it is unrealistic
for courts to demand this of a defendant in order to grant him relief.
A viable alternative would permit the defendant to successfully
attack his conviction even without proof of prosecutorial complicity
in cases where a key prosecution witness recants his trial testimony
on the basis of honest mistake, where a vital witness for the state
admits he perjured himself in the original trial, or where later
evidence disproves trial testimony which was important to the
government's case. The generic term "false evidence," used to
describe admitted evidence later proven untrustworthy, should
include trial testimony which is repudiated in any of the ways
"No such circumstance exists in the illustrative situation presented here. The witness was

honest in his original mistake, and the prosecutor had little reason to doubt the accuracy of
his identification. Mistaken identifications and the fallibility of eyewitness testimony are not

unknown commodities in our courts.
4

United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 390 (ND. Ill. 1949). This

case was cited with approval in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264. 269 (1959). In jurisdictions
which require a knowing use of false evidence in order to grant relief, there has been some
salutary movement toward inclusion of situations wherein the prosecutor should have

discovered the falsity of the evidence, even though he claims lack of actual knowledge. Imbler
v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969):
While the prosecutor claimed not to have disbelieved these outright lies, he clearly had
cause to suspect them. The reckless use of highly suspicious false testimony is no less

damaging or culpable than the knowing use of false testimony, and a conviction based
upon such evidence must suffer the same consequence.

Although there are no cases directly holding that testimony which should have been
known to be false falls within the prohibition against the knowing use of perjured
evidence, a number of cases have directed their inquiries based upon the principle. Id.
at 807-08.
See also McMullen v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St. 2d 160, 168, 209 N.E.2d 449, 455 (1965). But see
Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 351 U.S. 986 (1956).
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described above." Reviewing courts should be available to determine
whether false evidence was employed on behalf of the state in a
criminal trial,4 3 and the materiality of such evidence in the guiltdetermining process."

A rule prohibiting such inquiry unless there is concomitant proof
"That false
evidence includes more than perjured testimony is explored in Hamric v. Bailey,
386 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1967). United States v. Kaplan. 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
indicates that perjury and mistake will be treated alike constitutionally.
Some authorities might contend that perjured testimony should be treated differently than
mistaken testimony. In analyzing any such contention, it should be first noted that serious
evidentiary problems are often encountered in establishing that perjury marred a witness's trial
testimony. See. e.g.. United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1969). So also it may be
difficult to demonstrate mistake by a witness. A way in which this might be approached,
however, presents itself in Johnson v. Bennett, 414 F.2d 50. 57 (8th Cir. 1969). res.'g 386 F.2d
677. 680 (8th Cir. 1967). wherein certain handwriting testimony which had been presented at
defendant's original trial was challenged. See also the conflicting expert testimony developed
at the original trial and later in habeas corpus in Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. I (1967). Once the
defendant establishes that mistaken evidence was employed against him and that the evidence
was material to the government's case. it would appear appropriate for him to obtain relief
just as the victim of perjured testimony may do. To grant relief to the perjury victim but deny
it to the defendant who is falsely convicted by a witness's honest mistake would be to say:
"'Defendants. if the witness against you was spiteful or was to gain something by your
conviction and therefore lied, you are entitled to justice; however, if he was simply a blundering
fellow who honestly believed in his mistaken identification of you. you may stay in jail." Any
such distinction appears irrational.
"Even where a witness recants his trial testimony. a judicial determination must be made
respecting the veracity of the witness's recantation. This task will inure to the trial judge
initially if the recantation is presented in connection with a motion for new trial and to a
habeas corpus court if such recanting occurs at a later point in time. The first step in all such
cases is to resolve whether the disputed testimony was in fact mistaken or false, followed by
an inquiry as to the role such testimony played in the original trial. See State v. Compiano,
154 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 1967). See also United States v. Johnson. 327 U.S. 106, 11I
(1946); Gordon v. United States. 178 F.2d 896. 900 (6th Cir. 1949). cert. denied. 339 U.S.
935 (1950); Smith v. Warden. 254 F.Supp. 805 (D. Md. 1966).
"Application of the harmless error standard may present too minimal a test in the false
evidence cases. See. e.g.. Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). To unsettle a conviction
under its tenets, to upset a judgment whenever there is a reasonable doubt indicating that false
evidence contributed to the conviction, might not effect a happy compromise between the need
to do justice and the desired finality of judgments. The tainted evidence should occupy an
important place in the trial record and have contributed significantly to the conviction in order
to void the judgment.
On the question of the materiality of tainted evidence and various tests employed, see Miller
v. Pate. 386 U.S. 1.4-5 (1967); United States v. Polisi. 416 F.2d 573. 577 (2d Cir. 1969):
Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 933 (1968);
Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35. 38 (5th Cir. 1968), ceri. denied. 394 U.S. 966 (1969): Larrison
v. United States. 24 F.2d 82. 87 (7th Cir. 1928); United States v. Whitley. 18 U.S.C.M.A.
20.23,39 C.M.R. 20 (1968): State v. Compiano. 154 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1967).
For a recent case applying the harmless error rule to suppressed evidence, Vve Jackson V.
Wainwright. 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968).
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of wrongdoing by the prosecutor or the police appears out of place
in modern criminal procedure. First, direct proof on the issue is rare
in most cases. Secondly, the prosecutor may be completely innocent
of wrongdoing, and the defendant nonetheless denied a fair trial due
to the impact on the jury of a mistaken or spiteful witness's
testimony. 5 For these reasons, requiring evidence of prosecutorial
immorality as an absolute precedent to habeas relief represents a less
than realistic approach to the false evidence problem.
CONCLUSION

Certain of the problems described in this article merit judicial
consideration at the highest state and federal levels. In the United
States Supreme Court, while the law has not been left in total
disarray in consequence of Giles v. Maryland,46 neither has there
been major clarification. Uncertainty exists concerning whether
convictions tainted by false or mistaken evidence are constitutionally
supportable in those numerous instances where the trial prosecutor
was unaware that false evidence was being used. Also, what rules
control police conduct respecting the disclosure of known facts or
evidence?
Resolution of these questions is especially significant for the
guidance of our habeas corpus courts, which most frequently
confront the problems discussed. The suggested direction of such
resolution has been treated. The established standard of certain
courts, to the effect that a conviction based on false evidence is
unassailable unless the defendant can prove a knowing use by the
prosecution, 7 appears inadvisable. Judicial concern in these cases
should concentrate on vouchsafing the right of fair trial to the
convicted person. 41 Hedged with appropriate standards requiring the
"=.S'et Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Lir. 1938).
"1386 U.S. 66 (1967).
17.
'e'.
,.g..
United States v. Jakalski. 237 F.2d 503. 504-05 (7th Cir. 1956). cert. dented,

353 U.S. 939 (1957): Taylor v. United States. 229 F.2d 826. 829. 833 (8th Cir.). cer. denied
351 U.S. 986 (1956): Hinley v. Burford. 183 I-.2d
581 (10th Cir. 1950): Imbler v. Craven.
298 F. Supp. 795. 807-08 (C.D. Cal. 1969). In Hysler v. State. 146 Fla. 593. 1 So. 2d 628

(1941). alfd. 315 U.S. 411 (1942). the Florida Supreme Court stated: "'Writ of error coram
nobis will not lie because of false
testimony given at trial by important witness. .

allegations of the petition do not show

. . .

.

.The

that the alleged falsity of the testimony of the

witness Baker was known to the prosecuting officer." Id. at 594. I So. 2d at 628.
"Salutary movement in this direction has occurred at the Supreme Court level. Important
language in Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) illustrates that the due process mandate
in these cases "is not the punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance
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defendant to demonstrate materiality of the tainted evidence, the

more liberal approach advocated here would threaten only those
final judgments which merit unsettlement.
In the field of suppressed evidence, most of the commentators

conclude that suppression by police or prosecutors violates the due
process mandate.49 Certain case authority indicates only partial
support for this conclusion, however, reserving judgment where
suppression of evidence is perpetrated by law enforcement officers of
the state who are only marginally connected with the trial
prosecutor. It is here contended that "state action" includes
misconduct by police officers of the state who are employed either
by the governmental subdivision which is prosecuting the defendant
or another: "[I]t thus makes no difference which agency of the state
violated due process. .

.

. Constitutional responsibilities may not be

avoided by carving out small units."50 Governmental action is
present and equally harmful whether local or remote law
enforcement officials suppress material evidence, evidence which the
defendant could put to some substantial use.5 1
of an unfair trial to the accused." Id. at 87. For a recent application of Brad. see People v.
Sumner, 252 N.E.2d 534 (111. 1969). See Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288,
295 (5th Cir. 1968); Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966); 74 YALE L.J. 136,
142 (1964).
"'Everett, Discoverr in Crintinal Cases-In Search of a Standard. 1964 DItKE L.J. 477, 51617; 1969 11. & SOCIAL ORDER. supra note 20; 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 764. 766 n.20 (1967). The
conclusion is buttressed by the result reached in Barton v. Wainwright, 412 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.
1969), which held it a constitutional violation when the record demonstrated suppression of
witnesses by a Florida sheriff. See also authorities cited note 21 supra.
5"Levy, Justice-After Trial. II N.Y.L.F. 240, 292 (1965). The fourteenth amendment
governs "any action of a state. 'whether through its legislature, through its courts, or through
its executive or administrative officers.'" Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935). In
a landmark survey of the criminal discovery problem, the propriety of imposing sanctions for
police as well as prosecutor misconduct in the suppression of evidence cases appears to have
been suggested. Everett, supra note 49:
In Brady. Napue. and Alcorta. the prosecutor had participated in withholding or
suppressing evidence favorable to the defendant. What if, however, the prosecutor is
unaware of the evidence favorable to the defendant because that evidence has also been
withheld from him by the investigators? In other words, should the principle of Brad,'
be affected by the identity of the, governmental agent who "helps shape a trial that
bears heavily on the defendant?" The actions of investigators in obtaining coerced
confessions have led to reversal on due process grounds of the convictions resulting
from those confessions. Would and should their actions in withholding evidence lead
to any different outcome? Id. at 516-17.
"For a most recent case assessing the requisite dimensions of prosecutorial nondisclosure
which will mandate a new trial for the accused, see United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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Instances of suppression or falsification of evidence hopefully

2
comprise isolated and infrequent features of American justice.

However, when convictions tainted by either of these maladies do
arise, our legal system must provide workable rules to effect prompt

cure.53 The need for such rules is perhaps best illustrated by the
extended struggle of prisoners with meritorious claims to attain
judicial relief.5
52

Movement to more liberalized discovery in our courts will doubtless assist in the challenge

of eliminating in advance well-founded claims of suppressed evidence. See State v. Eads, 166
N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969); State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359 (1965); ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND

PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 15, 30 (1969); Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an
Accused. 34 F.R.D. 87 (1964); 6 DUQUESNE L. REV...supra note 16.
.5See A BA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. STANDARDS
RELATING TO POST-CONVICTIONREMEDIES 31-39 (1967).
"See United States ev rel.
Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill.
1949), which
invalidated the 25-year-old conviction of the prisoner after finding *'[t]hat the wrongful
suppression by the prosecution of evidence which unquestionably would have established the
innocence of James Montgomery was a denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment .. "Id. at 391.
In Johnson v. Bennett, 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969), a 35-year-old conviction was overturned.
While the decisive issue centered on a burden of proof question, Judge Blackmun's wellconsidered opinion alluded to the false and suppressed evidence problems:
The integrity of Johnson's trial and conviction remains seriously clouded by the
allegations, seemingly not now controverted, of a sheriff's erroneous, if not false, report
and return as to the whereabouts and unavailability of an actually available but
imprisoned defense witness, and of the state's use of handwriting evidence now conceded
questionable even by the state's own present expert. Id. at 57.
The Johnson case had been presented in state as well as federal habeas corpus during
previous years, but it was only the final series of appeals which brought the described result.
See Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967) (decision by three-judge panel adverse
to prisoner), vacated. 393 U.S. 253 (1968) (remanding case for reconsideration), rev'd. 414
F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969) (8-0 en banc decision in favor of petitioner).
See also the controlling legal rule applied to deny relief in Hinley v. Burford, 183 F.2d 581
(10th Cir. 1950); United States v. Kaplan. 101 F. Supp. 7,11-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

